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) being truly omnipresent on the one hand, and God’s having a genuine conscious POV on the other. The article aims at displaying an incompatibility between God’s (. While nobody will ever know what it may be like to be God, there is a more basic question one may try to answer: does God have phenomenal consciousness, does He have experiences within a conscious point of view (POV)? Drawing on recent debates within philosophy of mind, I argue that He doesn’t: if God exists, ‘He’ is not phenomenally conscious, at least in the sense that there is no ‘divine subjectivity’. I also consider the problem of the missing tanquam pointed out by Koyré and Cohen and propose a solution. My final position is that we should read Newton as claiming that space in the venue in which God exercises his divine will. I also discuss Newton’s views on mind-body causation, divine extension, and divine analogy. The primary evidence for this comes from an experiment Newton performed involving after-images an experiment he recorded in his student notebook and corresponded with Locke about. I show that Newton had a considered position on the sensorium and the role it played in sensation and volition. The second is to show how my interpretation rescues Newton from Leibniz’s critiques.
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) Newton’s claim about space and God’s sensorium by situating those claims within Newton’s philosophical thought. The first is to offer a clear interpretation of (.
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Subsequent commentators have largely agreed. As is well known, Leibniz was quick to pounce on these passages as evidence that Newton held untenable or nonsensical views in metaphysics and theology. Although these passages are well-known, few commentators have offered interpretations of what Newton might have meant by these cryptic remarks. In the Queries to the Latin version of the Opticks Newton claims that space is God’s sensorium. The first consideration has to do with Newton's polemical context and the second has to do with the nature of his theological thought. Finally, I offer two considerations which, I hope, make the problem seem less serious than it first appears. Specifically, I show that it is incompatible with the orthodox position that God be entirely independent and self-determining. Following this, I discuss the ways in which this makes God depend on space for His existence and the reasons why this is unacceptable for traditional conceptions of God. I then show that Newton endorsed a principle according to which the existence of space is a necessary condition for the existence of any other entity. Part of this involves arguing that Newton denies that space is a (. First, I show that Newton believed that space was an entity and that God and space were ontologically distinct entities. Specifically, I argue that Newton's theory has the untenable consequence that God depends on space for His existence and is therefore not an independent entity. My goal in this paper is to elucidate a problematic feature of Newton's metaphysics of absolute space. Additionally, my proposal reinforces various theological desiderata including divine omnipresence and God’s necessity across possible worlds, while also supporting new perspectives on Ibn ‘Arabi’s influential notion of waḥdat al-wūjūd, understood as the absolute unity of being. Instead of supporting the historically dominant opposing viewpoints advancing either the principality of existence or of essence (aṣālat al-wujūd/al-māhiyya), I claim that God as omni-part aids renewed defence of the majority rejected view which upholds the combined principality of existence and essence together.
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) importance, derives from Ibn Sīnā’s celebrated distinction between essence and existence, and involves determining which is genuinely, objectively, real. This problem of principality, with regards to metaphysical primacy and (. This framework establishes God as literally a part of everything-an “omni-part.” Although consequential for the many prominent religious traditions featuring divine simplicity, my analysis focuses on potential implications for an important formative issue in medieval Islamic philosophy. In this paper, I defend an unconventional mereological framework involving the doctrine of divine simplicity, to surmount a significant yet neglected dilemma resulting from that long-standing view of God as absolutely, and uniquely, simple.